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Introduction
It has been nearly two decades since the credit card industry was deregulated with 
the promise of bringing greater competition and lower prices to consumers. In addition, 
technological advancements in underwriting, commonly referred to as risk-based pric-
ing, have widened the market for credit cards to lower- and moderate-income consum-
ers. The result: In 2004, 35 percent of households with incomes below $10,000 had credit 
cards, while more than half of households with incomes between $10,000 and $24,999 
had credit cards.1 
While much is made of this democratization of credit, there is less public awareness 
and consumer knowledge about how the cost of credit varies across different segments of 
the population. Last year alone, households received nearly 8 billion credit card solicita-
tions in their mailboxes.2 Often these solicitations promise teaser rates of 0 percent, or 
they might dangle the carrot of airline miles or cash-back rewards. 
But as our study uncovers, for about one-third of all cardholders, the carrot is not 
nearly as big as the stick. Today, almost all of the top 10 issuers of credit cards reserve the 
right to change the APR on the account at any time, for any reason.3 A single late pay-
ment—even by as little as minutes—can result in penalty interest rates that average 24.51 
percent. Under the shield of deregulation, credit card companies have shifted the cost 
of credit to individuals least able to afford it—using those profits to underwrite the free 
loans and bonus miles, rewards and other benefits enjoyed by higher income households. 
Our research found that four groups—low-income individuals, African Americans, La-
tinos and single females—bear the brunt of the cost of credit card deregulation through 
excessive fees and high interest rates.
Key Findings:
One-third of cardholders are paying interest rates in excess of 20 percent.
Cardholders with household incomes below $25,000 who have credit card bal-
ances are two times more likely than households earning $50,000, and five times 
more likely than households earning over $100,000, to pay interest rates higher 
than 20 percent.  
Cardholders with balances and household incomes between $25,000 and $50,000 
are nearly two times as likely as households earning more than $50,000, and four 
times more likely than households earning over $100,000, to pay such rates.  
Credit cardholders in the bottom two income quintiles with credit balances are 
more than twice as likely to pay penalty interest rates as those in the top two 
income quintiles.
African-American and Latino credit card holders with balances are more likely 
than whites to pay interest rates higher than 20 percent. 
•
•
•
•
•
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Seven percent of white cardholders, 15 percent of African-American cardholders, 
and 13 percent of Latino cardholders pay interest rates higher than 20 percent. 
Eleven percent of single women with credit card balances pay interest rates higher 
than 20 percent compared to 6 percent of single men with credit card balances.
In 2004, 21 percent of consumers reported missing or making a late payment.
Forty percent of African-American and 26 percent of Latino borrowers reported 
paying late or missing a payment.  
Twenty-two percent of single women and more than 30 percent of borrowers 
with incomes less than $25,000 also reported making a late payment or missing 
a payment. 
While personal responsibility must be exercised by consumers, the lending industry 
must also exercise corporate responsibility. In the current regulatory environment, the 
bargaining power between lender and borrower is heavily tilted toward the lender. The 
fact that the highest consumer costs are disproportionately borne by low-income fami-
lies, African Americans, Latinos and single females raises additional moral questions 
and underscores the need to reexamine the public policy and regulatory framework re-
lated to the credit card industry.
Background:  A Deregulated Credit Card Market
The credit card industry is measured on a scale of billions. Eight billion is the approxi-
mate number of credit card offers Americans received in 2006. The amount of debt owed 
on credit cards is $800 billion;4 $30 billion dollars is how much lenders profit each year.5
The billion-dollar scale of the industry must be viewed in the context of a wave of 
deregulatory actions that began in the late 1970s with a Supreme Court decision. In Mar-
quette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service Corp (hereafter “Marquette”) 
the Court ruled that Section 85 of the National Banking Act of 1864 allowed a national 
bank to charge its credit card customers the highest interest rate permitted in the bank’s 
home state—as opposed to the rate in the state where the customer resided.6 As a result, 
regional and national banks moved their operations to states with fewer protections for 
borrowers, such as South Dakota and Delaware, where there were no usury ceilings on 
credit card interest rates.
In the mid-1990s, further deregulation of the credit card industry occurred as the 
result of another Supreme Court ruling. In Smiley v. Citibank, the Court ruled that fees 
could be defined as “interest” for the purposes of regulation and thus were subject to the 
rules set by Marquette. As such, the laws regulating fees were now to be determined by 
the state laws in which the bank was located.
•
•
•
•
•
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The practical result of these two decisions is that state usury laws, which used to set 
limits or rules around interest rates and fees, are now toothless. Since Congress hasn’t 
stepped in to fill the void in consumer protection, there are no limits concerning when 
and how often card issuers can raise APRs or revise contract terms. In this deregulatory 
environment, the demand side of the market is split into two segments: consumers who 
pay low, competitive, regular APRs and the consumers who pay the high, delinquent, 
penalty APRs. Because of deregulation, each individual card issuer has virtually an un-
limited ability to revise its APR at any time for any consumer. Therefore, firms are able to 
“price discriminate” by charging low APRs to consumers who pay their bills on time and 
charging high, penalty APRs to the consumers who miss a payment—or whose payment 
arrives and is processed just minutes after their daily cutoff time. 
Price discrimination explains an important paradox in the credit card industry: the 
unfettered ability to offer different APRs and contract terms to different consumers 
makes the credit card market highly competitive for new customers. Firms compete 
by offering lower and lower introductory APRs and other perks, such as frequent flyer 
miles, consumer product rewards, and “cash-back” benefits to lure new customers.  This 
competition decreases margins and should therefore decrease industry profitability over 
time—but it doesn’t because the lucrative side of the credit card business comes from 
those who revolve their balances. It’s a side of the market missing any competitive fever. 
All the major card issuers feature similar terms: high penalty interest rates and fees, the 
ability to retroactively apply rate increases, and the right to change terms at any time, for 
any reason. 
As credit card debt has grown tremendously over the last decade, it has become even 
more important to understand how deregulation has impacted households. The research 
presented in this report provides an initial answer to a critically important, but unan-
swered, question: Who bears the cost of deregulation in the credit card industry? 
Uncovering the Facts About Who Pays the Most to 
Credit Card Companies
Dēmos commissioned original research from Dr. Jing Jian Xiao, Professor of Consumer 
Finance at the University of Rhode Island, along with Radovan Vadovic, Ph.D. candidate 
in economics at the University of Arizona, to determine which con-
sumers contribute most to credit card industry profits. A more detailed 
description of their methodology, including the equations used in their 
calculations, can be found later in this report, as well as in the technical 
appendix and the academic papers on which this brief is based.7
Using data from the Federal Reserve and CardData, an online data-
base of credit card industry information, the study categorized card-
holders into three groups: those paying 0 percent or low introductory 
APRs; those paying rates between 10 percent and 20 percent; and those paying interest 
rates in excess of 20 percent. The study determined statistically that 31 percent of credit 
One-third OF 
all credit card 
hOlders pay 
interest rates 
OF 20 percent 
Or higher.
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card accounts fall into the first group, 36 percent fall into the second, and 33 percent 
fall into the third. (See Technical Appendix for methodology.) This pattern supports the 
suggestion that the third group, those accounts paying punitively high interest rates, 
subsidize the low introductory APRs paid by the first group.
Table 1: Distribution of Interest Rates Paid By Cardholders with Balances
Percent of Credit Card 
Accounts with Balances Interest Rate
31% 0% or low introductory rate
36% Regular interest rate
33% Interest rate higher than 20%
The study then used the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to determine which 
households report paying the highest interest rates.  The Survey of Consumer Finances 
is conducted every three years by the Federal Reserve Board, providing comprehensive 
data on household assets and liabilities. Several SCF questions were used to make this 
determination. These questions probed cardholders’ interest rates and late payments. 
The frequency of these behaviors was then calculated on a sample weighted by income, 
marital status, gender, race and ethnicity.  
Going Inside the Credit Card Market:  
Different Borrowers, Different Prices
FOur types OF BOrrOwers
Credit card holders can be categorized into four groups. There are Non-Users who 
carry credit cards but do not utilize them. There are also Convenience Users who ac-
cumulate balances each month, but pay them in full without incurring interest charges. 
Revolvers are users who accumulate balances each month without paying them in full 
and incurring monthly interest charges as a result.  Late Payers make tardy payments or 
miss payments altogether, accumulating balances and incurring interest charges and late 
fees. These users are also subject to much higher interest rates.
Table 2: Major Types of Credit Card Users
Consumer Type Description
Non-Users Have credit cards but do not use them
Convenience Users Accumulate balances, but pay them in full each 
month, without incurring interest charges
Revolvers Accumulate balances without paying them in full 
and pay monthly interest
Late Payers Accumulate balances and miss payments, incurring 
higher interest charges and late fees
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Revolvers and Late Payers are the credit card industry’s most lucrative customers. 
These groups carry balances and pay interest and, therefore, generate the bulk of indus-
try profit and bear most of its costs.  Late Payers are especially lucrative to the credit card 
industry because they pay higher penalty interest rates and incur late fees, which result 
in rapidly growing balances.  
Which Credit Card Holders Pay the Most?
One of the most important determinants of the cost of credit is 
the interest rate. For credit card holders who revolve a balance, the 
cost of carrying a balance is determined by the credit card inter-
est rate. Credit card interest rates, usually published as the Annual 
Percentage Rate (APR), determine the amount of interest paid each 
month. The higher the rate, the more interest paid. While the aver-
age credit card interest rate has decreased over the last 10 years to 
12.71 percent, the divergence between the lowest and highest rates 
has actually increased dramatically. In 1990 the lowest credit card 
interest rate reported was 11.88 percent, and the highest interest rate 
reported was nearly double, at 22 percent. By 2004 the lowest credit 
card interest rate reported had dropped to 0 percent, while the high-
est reported credit card interest rate stood at an astounding 41 per-
cent.9 (See Chart A.)
Chart A: Credit Card Annual Percentage Rates, 1990–2005
sources:  carddata.com (lowest apr), Federal reserve Board (highest and average apr)
As illustrated in Chart A, fierce competition among credit card issuers for new card-
holders has driven interest rates to zero. However, the presence of very high, punitive 
interest rates shows that the market for cardholders who are Revolvers or Late Payers is 
not competitive in terms of interest rate pricing.
About a third of credit card accounts with balances pay little or no interest each month, 
which essentially amounts to a free or very low-cost loan. More than a third (36 percent) 
of accounts pay the regular interest rate. The final third of accounts pay interest rates that 
range from more than 20 percent to as high as 41 percent. (See Table 1.)
Our findings from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances reveal that four groups—
low-income individuals, African Americans, Latinos and single females—are more likely 
to report paying interest rates higher than 20 percent.
in 1990 the lOwest 
apr repOrted was 
11.88 percent, 
and the highest 22 
percent. By 2004, 
the lOwest was 0 
percent, while the 
highest jumped tO 
41 percent.
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interest rate By incOme
Cardholders with balances and household incomes below $25,000 
are more than twice as likely as households earning $50,000, and 
over five times more likely than households earning $100,000, to pay 
interest rates higher than 20 percent.  Cardholders with balances 
and household incomes between $25,000 and $50,000 are nearly 
two times as likely as households earning more than $50,000, and 
more than four times as likely as households earning $100,000, to 
pay such punitive rates. (See Table 3.) Similarly, credit card holders in 
the bottom two income quintiles with credit balances are more than 
twice as likely to pay penalty rates as those in the top two income 
quintiles.
Table 3: Households Paying More Than 20% APR, by Income
Income Group Percent with Interest Rate > 20%
< $10,000 15.1
$10,000 – $25,000 11.9
$25,000 – $50,000 11.2
$50,000 – $100,000 6.7
> $100,000 2.7
Income Quintile Percent with Interest Rate > 20%
Bottom 20% 12.3
Lower-middle 20% 12.2
Middle 20% 7.3
Upper-middle 20% 6.4
Top 20% 2.7
interest rate By race
African-American and Latino credit card hold-
ers with balances are more likely than whites and 
borrowers of other races to pay interest rates higher 
than 20 percent. Seven percent of white cardholders 
pay interest rates higher than 20 percent. About 15 
percent of African-American and 13 percent of La-
tino cardholders pay interest rates greater than 20 
percent.
Table 4: Households Paying More Than 20% APR, by Race/Ethnicity
Race/Ethnicity Percent with Interest Rate > 20%
African American 14.9
Latino 12.9
White 7.1
Other 7.4
lOw-incOme 
and lOwer-
middle incOme 
cardhOlders are 
aBOut Five times 
mOre liKely than 
the wealthiest 
cardhOlders tO 
pay mOre than 20 
percent interest.
aFrican-american and 
latinO cardhOlders 
are much mOre 
liKely than white 
cardhOlders tO pay 
interest rates higher 
than 20 percent.
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interest rate By gender
Eleven percent of single women with credit card balances pay interest rates higher 
than 20 percent compared to 6 percent of single men with credit card balances. (See 
Table 5.)
Table 5: Households Paying More Than 20% APR, by Gender
Gender Percent with Interest Rate > 20%
Single Women 11.0
Single Men 5.8
Borrower Beware: Penalties Are Likely
The modern credit card industry is one in which the lender has 
considerably greater leverage and power in the contract than does the 
consumer. Over the last decade, all the major issuers have adopted 
practices designed to trap consumers in high-cost debt when they 
slip-up—which may mean a tardy payment or going over their credit 
limit. One slip-up can cause a cascade of penalties. While the market 
for new cardholders is competitive, with card issuers enticing new 
customers with the promise of rewards such as miles and low intro-
ductory rates, there is very little difference among the top 10 issuers 
in the policies and practices for those who revolve their balances. 
the late payment penalty
As families struggle to manage monthly credit card payments, they face difficult 
choices. Increasingly, late payments represent a financial survival strategy rather than a 
sign of irresponsible behavior.10  For many credit card holders, late payments are a result 
of unfair and often arbitrary payment deadlines. A credit card payment is considered late 
if it arrives after 1:00 pm or 2:00 pm on the day it is due. A late fee of $28, on average, is 
levied by issuers if a payment is just one day overdue.11 In addition to charging a fee, credit 
card companies will also raise the rate on the card for a tardy payment, with penalty rates 
now averaging just over 24 percent. In addition, these new higher rates are typically ap-
plied retroactively to the existing balance—making it much more difficult for households 
to pay down the existing debt. In one survey of card practices, only three issuers were 
found to not have penalty rates on their cards—and none of the three banks were close to 
being in the top 10 issuers, who now control nearly 90 percent of the market.12
universal deFault
In addition, consumers also can find themselves paying higher interest rates as a result 
of an industry practice known as universal default. Universal default is the policy of rais-
ing the interest rate on a credit card due to changes in a consumer’s credit score, often 
due to a late payment to another creditor. For example, if you make a late payment on 
Card X, Card Y will raise your interest rate as well—even though you have never missed 
or made a late payment on Card Y. 
a payment made 
One day late can 
cOst an average 
$28 Fee and raise 
a cardhOlder’s 
interest tO a 
penalty rate OF 24 
percent Or mOre.
8 Dēmos: A Network for Ideas & Action
Universal default has the chilling effect of shifting consumers into the penalty phase 
for all of their credit card accounts because of a single activity on one of them.  Moreover, 
the addition of loan obligations such as a mortgage or a car loan, as well late payments 
on these loans, can trigger a higher interest rate on a credit card. These forces trap too 
many borrowers in a dangerous cycle of debt, placing them in a precarious state where 
one small mistake can set off growing indebtedness across all of their accounts.
whO pays the penalty?
In order to understand who bears the bulk of penalty fees and higher credit card inter-
est rates, we need to know who is missing or making late payments on any type of debt.
In 2004, 21 percent of consumers reported missing or making a 
late payment. Forty percent of African-American and 26 percent of 
Latino borrowers reported paying late or missing a payment. Twenty-
two percent of single women and more than 30 percent of borrowers 
with incomes less than $25,000 also reported making a late payment 
or missing a payment. (See Technical Appendix for methodogy.)
Among those who reported paying late or missing a payment, 
42 percent reported the payment was late 60 days or more. These 
borrowers were more likely to be low-income, single or nonwhite. 
Among those with incomes less than $10,000, 50 percent reported a 
payment that was at least 60 days late.  Among those with incomes between $10,000 and 
$25,000, 53 percent reported payment that was at least 60 days late.  For single females 
that figure was 48 percent. For African Americans it was 44 percent, and for Latinos it 
was 29 percent. 
Policy Recommendations
While personal responsibility on the part of the consumer is important, the lending 
industry must also demonstrate corporate responsibility. In the current regulatory en-
vironment, the bargaining power between lender and borrower, is heavily tilted toward 
the lender. As one major issuer clearly states in its solicitation: “We reserve the right 
to change the terms of the account, including APRs, at any time, for any reason.” The 
practice of tripling or even quadrupling a cardholder’s interest rate for tardy or missed 
payments—in combination with applying this change to prior balances and to credit 
cards on which the borrower has never missed or made a late payment—amounts to 
unfair lending and must be addressed. The fact that the high consumer costs associated 
with this practice are disproportionately borne by low-income families, African Ameri-
cans, Latinos and single females raises additional moral questions and underscores the 
need to reexamine appropriate regulation and public policy addressing the credit card 
industry practices.
universal deFault 
can mean that a 
payment late On 
One card will 
result in  higher 
interest rates On 
Other, unrelated 
accOunts.
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Addressing Industry Practices and Enacting  
a Borrower’s Security Act
Today there are no legal bounds to the amount of fees and interest credit card compa-
nies can charge borrowers. In addition, credit card companies, unlike other lenders, are 
allowed to change the terms on the card at any time, for any reason. As a result, card-
holders often borrow money under one set of conditions and end up paying it back under 
a different set of conditions. Legal limits on interest rates and fees have traditionally been 
established by the states. However, because card companies can export interest rates 
from the state in which they are based, consumers are left unprotected from excessive 
rates, fees and capricious changes in account terms.
Low-income, Latino, African-American and single female consumers suffer most 
from this lack of protection. As a result, these groups in effect subsidize low introductory 
APRs, the nearly 8 billion credit card offers sent out each year, and the estimated $30 
billion generated profits.  
Dēmos has developed a Borrower’s Security Act that would restore responsible credit 
practices to the lending industry by extending fair terms to borrowers. Specifically, the 
reforms should include the following:
Eliminate universal default terms by requiring that any penalty rate or fee in-
crease be linked to a material default directly related to that specific account.
Limit penalty rate increases to no more than 50 percent above the account’s 
original rate. (For example, a 12 percent interest rate could only be increased to 
an 18 percent penalty rate.) This would still provide the issuer with significant 
additional protection against payment risk.
Provide at least 30 days’ advance notice that the card issuer is invoking the pen-
alty pricing clause.
Prohibit the retroactive application of pricing changes so that rate changes are 
applied only to purchases made after the issuer gives notice of the rate change. 
Ensure that grace periods and payment posting rules and practices are not de-
signed to trigger late charges and penalty rates for minor tardy payments.  
Require disclosure of the full costs of making only the minimum payments on a 
credit card, including the number of years and total dollars it will take to pay off 
the debt.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Technical Appendix 
An Excerpt from “The Cost of Deregulating the Credit Card Industry and its Impli-
cations for Consumers,” Vadovic and Xiao, 2006.
This brief is based on research commissioned by Dēmos and conducted by Professor 
Jing Jian Xiao of the University of Rhode Island and Radovan Vadovic of the University 
of Arizona.  Readers are referred to their academic paper, “The Cost of Deregulating the 
Credit Card Industry and its Implications for Consumers,” for further details.  Below is 
an edited excerpt detailing the methodology used in this work.
Relative Distribution of the Regulation Cost among Consumers
Credit card companies earn the majority of their revenue by trapping delinquent con-
sumers in debt. The natural question to ask is: “What share of consumers pay the exces-
sive interest on their loans and thus bear the cost of the competition in the industry?” We 
have already argued that these delinquent consumers pay for the competition between 
issuers by enabling them to issue cards with long (commonly one year) introductory 0 
percent APRs. In this section we will attempt to estimate who shares what proportion of 
the interest revenue. 
There are three groups of consumers: 
Those who pay a low (we assume 0 percent) introductory APR.
Those who pay the regular APR—which falls in the range between 10 percent and 
20 percent. 
Those who pay the delinquent, punitive APR, which is anywhere from 20 percent 
to 41 percent.
We are interested in evaluating the proportion of consumers in each category.
Calculating the Proportion of the “Subsidized” Consumers
As a first step we find the proportion of “subsidized” consumers who pay 0 percent 
APR. Call φi the proportion of consumers belonging in the group i ∈ {1,2,3}, as defined 
above. Then, we have 
φ1(0%)+φ2APR2+ φ3APR3 = APRA                                                                                 (5.1)
Similarly,
(5.2)
1.
2.
3.
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Next, we can rewrite expression (5.1) as
(5.3)
and by substituting (5.2) into (5.3) we get
 φ1(0%)+(1-φ1)APRB = APRA                                                                                             (5.4)
Now, we can change this into a statistical equation by adding an error term. The coef-
ficient of interest is the φ1. The equation that we estimate is reformulation of (5.4), i.e.,
APRB - APRA = φ1APRB + ε                                                      (5.5)
The data that we used for the estimation were the monthly time series for the time 
period between January 2001 and April 2005. The following variables were used:
 APRA : Comes from the Consumer Credit Section of the Federal Reserve Statisti-
cal Release. APRA is given by expression (5.1), i.e., it is the average APR that is 
charged to all consumers carrying balances.
 APRB : Comes from the CardData database provided by CardWeb.com. APRB is 
given by expression (5.2), the average APR for the population of consumers who 
are charged the regular and punitive APRs. In other words, all individuals with 
introductory and bonus rates, such as 0 percent APRs, are excluded from this aver-
age.
Note that the unit of analysis here is consumer revolving accounts. Consumers here 
refer to consumer revolving accounts. The results from the regression show that the pro-
portion of consumers who are offered introductory APRs and who are subsidized in this 
way is surprisingly high, i.e., 31 percent. The statistic is significant at 5 percent level. This 
tells us that the remaining portion, i.e., 69 percent, of all consumer accounts are generat-
ing interest. 
Calculating the Proportion of Consumers Who Pay Punitive Rates
The next step is to break the 69 percent of consumers into those who pay the regular 
interest rate and those who pay the punitive rate. We do so as follows.  Consider equation 
(5.2) and let  . Then, necessarily,  . We can proceed to estimate 
(5.2) as
αAPR3+(1-α)APR2 = APRB
(5.6)
APRB - APR2  = αAPR3 + ε
The variables that we used for estimation came from the CardData database at Card-
Web.com: As before, we have a monthly time series for the period from January 2001 
until April of 2005. We used the following variables:
1.
2.
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APR2 : The variable for the regular APR was constructed by adding 9.5 percent to 
the prime rate for each month. (This proxy variable was suggested to us by Jes-
sica Zentz of CardWeb.com, personal communication, July 14, 2005.)  There is no 
source of data known to us that would provide information on the regular APR. A 
statistic on the regular APR would be very hard to characterize since credit card 
companies compete against each other either in prices (by APRs) or they use non-
price competition, such as bonus programs, etc., that in turn affect prices. Hence, 
it is very hard to discern which APR is regular and which is part of (or affected by) 
a special offer.
 APR3 : This variable comes from the survey of the 10 largest credit providers in 
the industry. We averaged over the highest APR that each of the issuers reported. 
Thus, for each month we got the average highest APR that was charged to the 
consumers. 
We can be quite confident that these APRs are the punitive charges as they exceed the 
20 percent mark. The average APR for our sample is 24 percent with the range between 
22 percent and 26 percent. However, we feel that using this proxy gives us an underes-
timate as these APRs seem quite low. Delinquent individuals are routinely charged an 
APR close to the 30 percent mark with the industry high being 41 percent for the past 
year. But since we lack another representative index for the punitive APR, we use our 
constructed averages for the estimation.  
The results of our estimation only confirm our concerns about APR3 being low. The 
coefficient α equals 48 percent. This would mean that about 48 percent of all revolving 
balances are generating punitive revenue. Overall, we have now estimated proportions 
for all three groups:
For the subsidized group the proportion is equal to φ1 = 31%.
For the regular group the proportion is equal to 
φ2 = (1-φ1) α φ2 = (1-φ1)(1-α) = 0.69*0.52 = 36%. 
For the delinquent group the proportion is equal to φ3 = (1-φ1)α = 0.69*0.48 = 
33%. 
Distribution of the Deregulation Cost among Consumers
We are interested in knowing which consumers are more likely to pay punitive interest 
rates and late payment fees. To answer this question, we used data from the 2001 Survey 
of Consumer Finance (SCF). This data was then updated using the 2004 survey.
In the SCF, several questions are relevant to our research purpose. One question was 
about the interest rate on the credit card account with the highest balance. The wording 
of the question (X7132) is: “What interest rate do you pay on the card where you have 
the largest balance? What is the interest rate on the card you got most recently? What 
interest rate do you pay on this card?” 
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.
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The other two questions are about late or missed payments. The wording of this first 
question (X3005) is: “Now thinking of all the various loan or mortgage payments you 
made during last year, were all the payments made the way they were scheduled, or were 
payments on any of the loans sometimes made later or missed? 1. All paid as scheduled 
or ahead of schedule; 5.  Sometimes got behind or missed payments; 0.  Inapplicable.”
The wording of the following question (X3005) is: “(if answered 5 in X3004) Were you 
ever behind in your payments by two months or more? 1. Yes; 5. No; 0. Inapplicable.” 
We calculated frequencies of these variables with the weighted sample in terms of 
income, marital status/gender, and racial/ethnic groups. 
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